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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 10 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§lO.l. Public authorities and public works financing. Increas-
ingly, in the past quarter of a century, there has been financing and 
operation of public works projects by public "authorities," which are 
official agencies separate and distinct from the Commonwealth and its 
conventional political subdivisions. Thus, local housing authorities,! 
redevelopment authorities,2 the Metropolitan Transit Authority,3 the 
New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket Steam-
ship Authority,4 the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,5 and the Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority,6 to make an incomplete catalog, are in-
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Arthur J. Caron, Jr., 
of the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§1O.1. !G.L., c. 121, §26K, originally inserted by Acts of 1938, c. 484. 
2 G.L., c. 121, §26QQ, inserted by Acts of 1952, c. 617. 
3 Acts of 1947, c. 544, as frequently amended. The basic statute, as amended, is set 
forth as an appendix following Chapter 162 in Mass. General Laws Annotated. 
4 Acts of 1948, c. 544. 
5 Acts of 1952, c. 354. 
6 Acts of 1956, c. 465. The enabling legislation covering this authority is set 
forth as an appendix (§§l-l to 1-35) following Chapter 91 in Mass. General Laws 
Annotated. The Port Authority has perhaps the most comprehensive jurisdiction 
of all the authorities created in Massachusetts. It has been commissioned to take 
over the Logan and Hanscom Airports, formerly administered by the Airport Man-
agement Board as an agency of the Commonwealth (G.L., c. 91A, inserted by Acts 
of 1948, c. 637), the Sumner Tunnel, owned by the City of Boston, and a parallel 
tunnel to be constructed by the authority, the harbor facilities once under the Port 
of Boston Authority (Acts of 1945, c. 619) and more lately under the Port of Bos-
ton Commission (Acts of 1953, c. 608), and the facilities of the Mystic River Bridge 
Authority (Acts of 1946, c. 562). The enabling act also gives the authority potential 
jurisdiction over a variety of matters in Boston and the metropolitan area. 
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dependent entities that have constructed or acquired, and operate, 
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of public works, the capital and 
operational costs of which are not primary obligations of the Com-
monwealth or of the various cities and towns. 
The general pattern of financing by these authorities is the issuance 
of long-term bonds, secured by earmarking the revenues from the 
projects for the benefit of bondholders. In some instances, deficit 
operations are underwritten by the Commonwealth 7 or by designated 
municipalities.s In such instances, the guarantee of the governmental 
body is part of the security of the bondholders.9 
The reasons for conducting public works programs through authori-
ties rather than through state or municipal government departments 
are manifold. In some states, one obvious purpose is to avoid debt 
limitations imposed by the state constitution. Whether this particular 
phase of an authority's function be characterized as "avoidance" or 
"evasion," 10 there are other reasons for conducting public programs 
through authorities. The financing of some programs by authority 
revenue bonds reduces the total amount that would otherwise have to 
be financed directly by government, so that state and municipal bonds 
may be able to command more favorable interest rates. Again, the 
authority may be a flexible administrative device when the projected 
public work crosses municipal or state boundary lines.11 Still again, 
the use of an authority may be an effective means of providing excep-
tions to the civil service laws that regulate generally the employment 
of personnel in the public service.12 
The legislature, at its 1958 session, created a "nonprofit" corporation 
called the Massachusetts State Office Building Association.13 The 
function of the association was to obtain a site and to erect thereon a 
7 For example, certain functions of local housing authorities (see Opinion of the 
Justices, 322 Mass. 745, 78 N.E.2d 197 (1948», and the New Bedford, Woods Hole, 
Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority, supra note 4 (see New 
Bedford v. New Bedford, etc. Steamship Authority, 336 Mass. 651, 148 N.E.2d 637 
(1958), appeal dismissed sub nom. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank v. New Bedford, 
358 U.S. 53, 79 Sup. Ct. 95, 3 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§11.1, 16.1). 
S For example, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra note 3, and the New 
Bedford, etc. Steamship Authority, supra note 4. 
II New Bedford v. New Bedford, etc. Steamship Authority, 336 Mass. 651, 148 
N.E.2d 637 (1958), 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.1, 16.1. 
10 Discussions of this point are sometimes tinged with polemics. See Morris, 
Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion 
of State Constitutions, 68 Yale L.J. 234 (1958). For more moderate conclusions, 
see Netherton, Area·Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by 
Proclamation, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 678 (1955); Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 553 (1957). 
11 The classic instance of an authority created for this purpose is the Port of New 
York Authority, established by New York and New Jersey under an interstate com· 
pact. N.Y. Laws 1921, c. 203; N.]. Laws 1921, c. 152. The consent of Congress to the 
compact is expressed in 42 Stat. 174 (1921). 
12 For example, when the Metropolitan Transit Authority was created a policy 
decision was made not to include the employees of the street railway system under 
the coverage of the civil service laws. Acts of 1947, c. 544, §18. 
13 Acts of 1958, c. 603. 
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building to provide office space and appurtenant facilities for the Com-
monwealth and its various departments and agencies. The building 
was to be leased to the Commonwealth by the association. Site acqui-
sition and construction were to be financed by bonds of the asso-
ciation, payable "solely from the funds of the Association." The 
association was authorized to pledge rents receivable under the lease 
to the Commonwealth as security for payment of its bonds. Upon 
the retirement of the association's bonds the building was to become 
the property of the Commonwealth. 
In accordance with the terms of the statute, the association entered 
into a lease with the Commonwealth for a term of years, at an annual 
rental first payable in the year of the projected completion of the 
building, plus "additional rent" in amounts required to satisfy claims 
against the association. 
Ayer v. Commissioner of Administration14 was a statutory15 tax-
payers' suit to enjoin performance of the contract of lease. The Su-
preme Judicial Court granted the relief sought, and held that the 
enabling act violated Article 62, §3, of the State Constitution,16 since 
its enactment had not been by a two-thirds vote in each house of the 
legislature. 
The Court ruled that the proposed bond issue of the association, 
which was the core of the operation, was in reality a borrowing by the 
Commonwealth because, notwithstanding the separate entity of the 
association, "viewing the project as a whole, the Association is nothing 
more than a mere intermediary to carry out only one purpose," 17 
and, "In substance, the corporation is a device for payments by the 
Commonwealth to bondholders .... " 18 It concluded, "Viewing re-
alities, we consider that the so called 'rentals' are not really rentals at 
all, but in practical effect are instalment payments on account of a 
purchase by the Commonwealth of an office building, with full title 
to be acquired at an indefinite future date." 19 
Earlier cases, in which authorities had been held separate in sub-
stance as well as in form from state and municipal governments, were 
distinguished as follows: "These entities all exist for more than a 
single, temporary purpose. They perform services for others than the 
sovereign itself. They acquire income from those for whom their 
services are performed: the Gloucester pier association from sub-
lessees; the housing authorities from tenants; and the port and turn-
pike authorities from users of their facilities." 20 
Whether this is more than a verbal distinction may be debatable. 
14 340 Mass. 586,165 N.E.2d 885 (1960). 
15 G.L., c. 29, §63. Declaratory relief was also sought and granted. G.L., c. 231A, §6. 
16 Mass. Const., Amend., Art. LXII, §3: "In addition to the loans which may be 
contracted as before provided, the commonwealth may borrow money only by a 
vote, taken by the yeas and nays, of two-thirds of each house of the general court 
present and voting thereon .... " 
17340 Mass. 586, 593,165 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1960). 
18 340 Mass. at 594,165 N.E.2d at 890. 
19 Ibid. 
20340 Mass. at 595,165 N.E.2d at 890. 
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when faced with a similar con-
stitutional objection to a plan whereby an authority constructed a 
school building and leased it to a school district upon a rental that 
could be paid only from the proceeds of local taxes and state contribu-
tions, said: "It is plain enough that to be self-liquidating within the 
intent of the decisions of this Court, under various of the Authority 
Acts, a project need not directly pay for itself out of returns received 
therefrom by way of tolls or rates charged individual users of the 
facility." 21 
This statement, of course, could be put down as a judicial fiat, just 
as readily as could the propositions of the Massachusetts Court in the 
Ayer case. Indeed, it could be pointed out, as it was in the Ayer opin-
ion,22 that there is a substantial body of precedent holding that "boot-
strap" financing through public authority bonds is violative of debt 
limitation provisions of state constitutions. 
The fact is that measuring the validity of new public financing tech-
niques by earlier constitutional provisions for debt limitations is essen-
tially a Procrustean process. It judges the new techniques as they do 
or do not fit into categories that were never designed to include them. 
Of course, the process of constitutional exposition is frequently one 
of adapting ancient criteria to new phenomena, but ideally the new 
phenomena should be examined in full perspective before it is deter-
mined whether they are adaptable to the old text. 
The point of quoting the Pennsylvania doctrine on authority rev-
enue bonds is that it expresses the culmination of an evolutionary 
course of deliberation about the legal status of authorities. When the 
matter originally came before it, the Pennsylvania Court came to the 
seemingly obvious conclusion that authority financing was an evasion 
of the constitutional prohibition of excessive public indebtedness.23 
Subsequently, however, the same court, after examination of all of the 
factual implications of the relatively new financing method, overruled 
its initial decision.24 
The Ayer decision leaves unanswered many questions as to the ex-
tent to which the ingenuity of legislative draftsmen will make possible 
"bootstrap" financing through authority revenue bonds by introducing 
formal differences between the organization of new authorities and 
that of the State Office Building Association. That question, how-
ever, is not likely to come up in the context of financing the construc-
tion of a state office building. After the decision on the Ayer case, 
the legislature enacted a statute25 creating a Government Center Com-
mission as an independent agency in the Department of Public Works, 
which is to erect a state office building and several other buildings, all 
to be financed through bonds of the Commonwealth. 
21 Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, 361 Pa. 543, 552, 64 A.2d 659, 663 (1949). 
22340 Mass. 586, 598, 165 N.E.2d 885,892 (1960). 
23 Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 Atl. 501 (1936). 
24 Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 Atl. 140 (1937). 
25 Acts of 1960, c. 635. 
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§lO.2. Improvement of urban areas and tax concessions. During 
the 1960 SURVEY year the constitutional problems involved in effective 
planning for the rehabilitation of a large segment of Boston's Back 
Bay area were finally resolved, and a useful pattern for municipal re-
planning was established. The problem of planning the growth of 
the Back Bay section became acute shortly prior to 1955, when the 
Boston &: Albany Railroad announced the imminent abandonment of 
its Huntington Avenue yards, a substantial area then devoted to rail-
road uses. A plan was devised whereby the land would be purchased 
by the City of Boston, acting through a Back Bay Development Com-
mission, and then sold to a corporation that would undertake to de-
velop it in accordance with a plan to be approved by the Commission. 
As an inducement to the developer, the tax liability of the develop-
ment was to be limited during at least the first forty-five years of its 
existence. 
An advisory opinionl declared that the proposal was subject to con-
stitutional infirmities. The tax concession feature of the proposal was 
said to be violative of the constitutional requirements that taxes be 
equal,2 and proportional and reasonable.3 Furthermore, the Justices, 
implementing a dictum in an earlier case,4 ruled that the taking of 
vacant land for the purpose of preventing its maldevelopment was 
not a taking for a public purpose.5 
Subsequently, the Prudential Insurance Company of America made 
known its purpose of constructing on the railroad site and on the land 
formerly occupied by the Mechanics Building a large complex of 
buildings consisting of office, hotel, commercial, and residential build-
ings. The practicality of the project, however, was contingent upon 
the developer receiving assurance that the tax liability of the project 
would be limited for a period of eighty years. 
In order to supply this contingency, a proposal was drafted whereby 
the site of the project would be acquired by the Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority,6 which would be authorized to construct thereon a 
public truck terminal and a public garage, in connection with the con-
struction of the Massachusetts Turnpike into Boston. The proposal 
envisaged that the authority might then lease the air space above its 
buildings to Prudential, which in turn could construct thereon its 
projected buildings. The proposal went on to fix an annual amount 7 
that would be payable in lieu of taxes to the city of Boston until the 
§IO.2. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955), discussed 
and criticized in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.7. 
2 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X. 
3 Id., Part 2, c. I, §I, Art. IV. 
4 Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954), discussed 
and criticized in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2. 
II 332 Mass. 769, 781-784, 126 N.E.2d 795, 802·803 (1955). 
6 Created by Acts of 1952, c. 354. 
7 The proposal was that there should be paid in lieu of taxes the annual sum 
of $3 million, plus an additional amount as determined by an involved formula cal-
culated upon gross rentals. 
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year 2040. The proposal sought to meet the constitutional objection 
to tax concessions on the theory that, with ownership of the fee in 
the authority, the authority could be given tax exemption, as it was in 
its enabling act,S and there would be no difficulty about tax concessions 
as to the buildings, since buildings are not taxed apart from the land 
upon which they are built. 
An advisory opinion,9 however, ruled that the proposal was subject 
to a constitutional defect. Although the Justices, in 1956,10 had taken 
a closer look at the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Berman v. Parkerll and modified that portion of their 1955 opin-
ion12 in which they had ruled that the taking of a blighted open area 
for the purpose of controlling future development thereof was not a 
taking for a public purpose, they nonetheless ruled that the proposed 
acquisition of the Back Bay land was not demonstrably for a public 
purpose. They pointed out that the authority was merely authorized, 
not required, to construct the road, the truck terminal, and the garage, 
all of which were clearly "public purposes." They went on to inti-
mate that, apart from this, it failed to appear that the private benefit 
to Prudential would not far outweigh whatever benefit there might be 
to the public from the road, the terminal, and the garage. 
Although they rejected the proposed plan, the Justices interpersed 
throughout the opinion some unusually broad hints as to the form of 
a plan that would be constitutionally acceptable. In consequence, a 
new plan was drawn up. It proposed modifications of the Urban Re-
development Corporation Law13 by providing that "blighted open 
areas" need not, as formerly, be developed for predominantly residen-
tial uses, and by making various administrative modifications of the 
statute. 
Since the 1956 advisory opinion14 had ruled that limited dividend 
redevelopment corporations, operating projects approved by local plan· 
ning authorities and subject to extensive public regulation, could prop-
erly be given tax concessions, the theory of the proposal was that the 
Prudential project could be accomplished by undertaking it through 
an urban redevelopment corporation, organized for the purpose. In 
an advisory opinion15 the Justices agreed. They pointed out, with 
specific reference to the Prudential project, such public advantages as: 
. . . the elimination of grave doubts as to the future use of a 
great area, now largely vacant or occupied by a nearly obsolete, 
8 Acts of 1952, c. 354, §13. 
9 Opinion of the Justices, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 167 N.E.2d 745. This opinion 
is also discussed in §13.8 infra. 
10 Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 760, 135 N.E.2d 665 (1956). 
11 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98,99 L. Ed. 27 (1954). 
12 332 Mass. 769, 781-784,126 N.E.2d 795, 802-803 (1955). 
13 C.L., c. 121A. 
14 334 Mass. 760, 135 N.E.2d 665 (1956). 
15 Opinion of the Justices, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 168 N.E.2d 858, also dis-
cussed in §13.8 intra. 
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unsightly, railroad freight yard; covering over a railroad right 
of way; improvement to neighboring properties; the encourage-
ment of prompt action unlikely to be undertaken by private enter-
prise in the foreseeable future; stimulation of other building and 
opening a new opportunity for urban growth at what might be a 
time which is appropriate but of short duration; and new facili-
ties made available to public use.16 
These considerations, in addition to the limited dividend character 
of the developing corporation and the degree of public control over 
the basic project plan and its operation provided in the Urban Re-
development Corporation Law, apparently sufficiently offset the pri-
vate benefits accruing to the developer to warrant characterization of 
the project as predominantly one for a public purpose. 
After the advisory opinion, the legislature enacted the proposal into 
law,17 amending G.L., c. l2lA, with special provisions applicable to 
Boston, notably the abolition of the local planning board and the 
investment of the Boston Redevelopment Authority with its former 
functions. 
§lO.3. Pre-emption under the United States Shipping Act. Bay 
State Stevedoring Co. v. Bosto~ & Maine Railroad 1 was a suit brought 
under the common law of restraint of trade and the Massachusetts 
Anti-trust Law2 to restrain an alleged conspiracy to monopolize steve-
doring and related services at piers controlled by the railroad. Prior 
to January 1, 1959, the plaintiff, along with other stevedoring com-
panies, rendered stevedoring services at the piers in accordance with 
contractual arrangements made between the respective stevedoring 
companies and various steamship companies. On that date there be-
came effective an agreement among the railroad, Universal Terminal 
and Stevedoring Company, and their subsidiaries, by which Boston 
Marine Terminal Corporation, a subsidiary of Universal, would ex-
clusively perform all cargo handling, including stevedoring, at the 
piers. Berths at the piers were denied vessels that would not use the 
services of Boston Marine. In consequence, one vessel that had a 
stevedoring contract with the plaintiff for unloading was refused a 
berth at the piers. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the suit was properly dis-
missed, on the ground that the United States Shipping Act 3 con-
ferred upon the Federal Maritime Board exclusive primary jurisdiction 
of the subject matter of the suit, so that state, as well as federal, courts 
lack jurisdiction over such a matter. 
The Shipping Act covers not only common carriers by water, but 
also "other persons subject to this chapter," a term including any per-
161960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029, 1044, 168 N.E.2d 858,869. 
17 Acts of 1960, c. 652. 
§10.3. 1340 Mass. 512, 165 N .E.2d 84 (1960). 
2 G.L., c. 93, §§2-4. 
3 Act of Sept. 7, 1916, c. 451, 39 Stat. 728, 46 U.S.C. §§801-842 (1958). 
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son, "who carries on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, 
dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a com-
mon carrier by water." 4 The act further provides that "Every com-
mon carrier by water and every other person subject to this chapter 
shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations 
and practices related to or connected with the receiving, handling, 
storing or delivering of property." /I It goes on to provide that the 
Maritime Board may entertain complaints of violation of the act, 
and may, if it finds a complaint warranted, make such order as it deems 
proper.6 
In one important respect this appears to be a case of first impression. 
It has been held that a railroad company that owns a pier is an "other 
person subject to this chapter" and so subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Maritime Commission7 with respect to a regulation concerning "free 
time" on the pier for cargo removed by truck.8 And, as the opinion 
in Bay State documents,9 it is well established that when the Maritime 
Board has jurisdiction, its primary jurisdiction is exclusive. The re-
ported cases, however, all appear to deal with regulations and prac-
tices directly impinging upon the relation between carrier and shipper, 
such as collusive rate fixing, unreasonable demurrage charges, dis-
criminations against shippers or ports, and the like. 
What is here decided, apparently for the first time, is that what is 
basically a dispute between rival stevedoring companies, with more 
or less remote impact upon the carrier-shipper relationship, is taken 
out of the domain of state law by the Shipping Act. This conclusion 
seems to be drawn from a literal reading of the Shipping Act, with-
out inquiry as to whether it requires interpretation. 
In other areas of federal regulation, it has been customary to subject 
congressional enactments to a detailed, sometimes esoteric, process of 
analysis prior to resolution of the question whether they supersede 
state laws. Acts of Congress regulating railroad equipment,10 food and 
drugs,l1 and subversive activities,12 to name but a few instances, were 
critically construed before their effect on the operation of state laws 
was determined. In the field of labor relations, the most litigious 
4 Shipping Act §1, 46 V.S.C. §801 (1958). 
/I Id. §17, 46 V.S.C. §816 (1958). 
II Id. §22, 46 V.S.C. §821 (1958). 
7 The Maritime Commission was the predecessor of the present Maritime Board, 
created by 1950 Reorganization Plan No. 21, 15 Fed. Reg. 3178, 64 Stat. 1273, 46 
V.S.C.A. §1111, note. 
8 Baltimore &, Ohio R.R. v. Vnited States, 201 F.2d 795 (lid Cir. 1953). 
9340 Mass. 512, 517,165 N.E.2d 84, 87 (1960). 
10 Compare Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 V.S. 280, 34 Sup. Ct. 829, 
58 L. Ed. 1312 (1914), with Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 V.S. 605, 47 
Sup. Ct. 207, 71 L. Ed. 432 (1926). 
11 Compare Savage v. Jones, 225 V.S. 501, 1I2 Sup. Ct. 715, 56 L. Ed. 1182 (1912), 
with McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 V.S. 115, 1I11 Sup. Ct. 4111, 57 L. Ed. 754 (19111). 
. 12Compare Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 1I50 V.S. 497,76 Sup. Ct. 477, 100 L. Ed. 640 
(1956), with Vphaus v. Wyman, 1I60 V.S. 72, 79 Sup. Ct. 1040, 1I L. Ed. 2d 1090 
(1959). 
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battleground of the federal pre-emption issue, there was a process of 
extremely close determination of statutory meaning, beginning, say, 
with the Briggs-Stratton easelS down to the apparently definitive14 de-
cision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.l5 
Of course, the end result of the Bay State case might well have been 
the same, even if the Court had scrutinized the Shipping Act and had 
found that it does not supersede the state laws. There was a ruling 
that the plaintiff stevedoring company was engaged in interstate and 
foreign commerce,16 so that the Court might have been called upon 
to reconsider or distinguish its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. 
McHugh17 and dismiss the bill on the ground that the dispute was 
governed by the federal anti-trust laws.18 
§IO.4. General. During the SURVEY year a number of other cases 
hinged upon points of constitutional doctrine. While they do not 
appear to call for extended discussion, they should be noted at this 
point. 
The conviction in the Brinks Robbery Case1 was subjected to an 
unsuccessful collateral attack in the Federal District Court.2 The 
defendants renewed the contentions, made at the trial and before the 
Supreme Judicial Court, that their rights to Fourteenth Amendment 
due process had been invaded by massive pre-indictment and pre-trial 
publicity stimulated by public officials. 
Assuming, arguendo, the truth of the pleaded allegations concern-
ing the massiveness and the official inspiration of the publicity, Judge 
Wyzanski found it unnecessary to take evidence in support of the al-
legations, and proceeded on the record made in the state court. He 
found entirely wanting in merit the contention that influence of the 
publicity upon the grand jury affected constitutional rights of the 
accused. As to the contention based upon exposure of trial jurors to 
the publicity, the judge ruled that, in the circumstances, it fell short of 
establishing a trial wanting in due process, since (1) the defendants 
had declined to move for a continuance or for a change of venue, and 
(2) the record showed a careful examination of jurors on the voir dire. 
The final contention of the defendants was that to penalize them for 
13 Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245. 69 
Sup. Ct. 516. 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949). 
14 A new set of pre·emption problems in the field of labor relations may be 
coming under §701(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 
1959. Pub. L. 86-257. 73 Stat. 519. 29 U.S.C. §164(c)(2) (Supp. 1959). which permits 
state courts and agencies to assert jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the 
NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction. See 1959 AIm. Surv. Mass. Law §13.7. 
15359 U.S. 236. 79 Sup. Ct. 773. 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959). 
16340 Mass. 512. 517.165 N.E.2d 84, 88 (1960). 
17326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950). 
1815 U.S.C. §§1-33 (1958). 
§1O.4. 1 Commonwealth v. Geagan. 339 Mass. 487. 159 N.E.2d 870 (1959), cert. 
denied sub nom. Geagan v. Massachusetts. 361 U.S. 895, 80 Sup. Ct. 200. 4 L. Ed. 
2d 152 (1959). noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.1. 
2 Geagan v. Gavin. 181 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1960). 
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failure to move for a continuance would be to force them to waive 
their right to speedy trial. This, too, was rejected, the Court pointing 
out that the concept of speedy trial was such a fluid one that it could 
not be assumed that at least one postponement of trial on account of 
the anticipated effect of massive publicity upon trial jurors would have 
been incompatible with the standard of speedy trial. 
An appeal has been heard by the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit, but at the time of going to press a decision has not been handed 
down. 
Lamson v. Secretary of the Commonwealths is of interest for more 
than the points actually decided. The case called for construction of 
Articles 21 and 22 of the Amendments to the State Constitution, as 
modified by Article 71. These provide for a decennial census, be-
ginning in 1935, and for legislative reapportionment of representative 
districts and of senatorial and councillor districts at the first regular 
session after the return of the enumeration of voters in the census. 
After the 1955 census, the legislature did not act upon reapportion-
ment until 1960, and then reapportioned only the senatorial and 
councillor districts.4 On petitions for mandamus to prevent the prep-
aration of election ballots on the basis of the reapportioned districts, 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that the power to reapportion re-
mained in the legislature, even though it had not been exercised at the 
constitutionally appointed time, and that reapportionment of sena-
torial and councillor districts was effective, although not accompanied 
by reapportionment of representative districts. 
While the decision settled some controversial issues of great practical 
importance, the case carries implications of perhaps greater signifi-
cance. First, although the Court has traditionally proclaimed that it 
is not bound, in litigated cases, by advisory opinions that its justices 
have rendered,!> there has been no case decided contra a ruling in an 
advisory opinion. On each of the major points in the Lamson case 
there appear in advisory opinions6 strong dicta that the Court refused 
to follow. While the Court pointed out that the advisory opinions in 
question were not directed to the precise issues involved in Lamson,7 
the brushing aside of these rather categorical statements is an indica-
tion that the doctrine of judicial reconsideration of advisory opinions 
is more than pious protestation. Secondly, the Court strongly inti-
'
mated that if the legislature persists in its failure to obey the constitu-
tional mandate to reapportion in its first session after the return of 
the decennial census, the judiciary may undertake the reapportionment 
of election districts.s Such a drastic remedy for unequal apportion-
s 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975, 168 N.E.2d 480. 
4 Acts of 1960, c. 432. 
5 Opinion of the Justices, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 785, 795, 167 N.E.2d 745, 750, and 
cases there cited. 
6 Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 619, 151 N.E. 680, 681 (1926); Opinion of 
the Justices, 157 Mass. 595, 598-599, 35 N.E. 111, 112-113 (1893). 
71960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975, 982·983, 168 N.E.2d 480, 485-486. 
81960 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 980, 168 N .E.2d at 484. 
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~ments had been disapproved by the Supreme Court of the United States,9 but some state courts have approved it,10 and the Supreme Court has agreed to take a case in which it may reconsider its earlier 
ecision.11 
Singleton v. Treasurer and Receiver General 12 clarified a point 
having an important bearing upon public finance. The Constitution 
provides,13 with respect to state borrowing, that except when money is 
borrowed for war or defense purposes or "in anticipation of receipts 
from taxes or other sources" the borrowing authority must be by two· 
thirds vote in each house of the legislature. When the Mount Greylock 
Tramway Authority was created,14 its project was directed to be 
financed through revenue bonds, payable solely from proceeds of tram-
way tolls. A 1959 amendment,15 however, provided that interest on 
tramway bonds would be guaranteed by the Commonwealth, and the 
Treasurer of the Commonwealth was authorized to borrow "in antici-
pation of appropriations" sums equal to deficiencies of toll revenues in 
the amounts necessary to meet annual bond interest obligations. Since 
the statute did not have a two-thirds vote in each house, the Court held 
the borrowing authorization defective. The authorized borrowing was 
not "in anticipation of receipts" but was, rather, as the Court put it, 
"to create receipts." 16 The Court distinguished this from other pub-
lic bond guarantees of the Commonwealth,17 in which state borrowing, 
even without two-thirds vote authorization, is lawful because it is in 
anticipation of "receipts" from deficiency assessments upon cities and 
towns within the area included within the bonded public works proj-
ect.18 
Stone v. City of Springfield 19 was a second 20 attempt to make a 
broadside attack upon the validity of the entire 1958 assessment of the 
real property in the city of Springfield. An action to recover taxes paid 
under protest 21 tendered the issue whether the assessing practices were 
9 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946). 
10 Asbury Park Press v. Wooley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960); Brown v. Saunders, 
159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). 
11 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), probable jurisdiction noted, 
364 U.S. 898, 81 Sup. Ct. 230, 5 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1960). 
12340 Mass. 646,165 N.E.2d 899 (1960). 
13 Mass. Const., Amend. Art. 62, §§2, 3. 
14 Acts of 1953, c. 606. 
15 Acts of 1959, c. 608, §§2-4. 
16340 Mass. 646, 650, 165 N.E.2d 899, 901 (1960). 
17 New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard, & Nantucket Steamship Author-
ity, Acts of 1948, c. 544, §9; Boston Elevated Railway Company, Acts of 1941, c. 139, 
§1; Metropolitan Transit Authority, Acts of 1947, c. 544, §13. 
18 A second attack upon the state guarantee of the Mt. Greylock bond interest 
sought to have the guarantee provision subjected to referendum. The attack was 
unsuccessful because the referendum petition was defective. Newman v. Secretary 
of the Commonwealth, 339 Mass. 749,162 N.E.2d 291 (1959). 
191960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 957,168 N.E.2d 76. 
20 In Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 157 N.E.2d 880 (1959), a suit 
to enjoin the 1958 assessments was dismissed as moot. 
21 G.L., c. 60, §98. 
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such as to violate the equality22 and the proportional-and-reasonable23 
provisions of the State Constitution and the equal protection clause of 
the Federal Constitution.24 The Court, however, did not reach the 
merits, holding that the declaration alleged conclusions rather than the 
facts necessary to set forth a cause of action. 
22 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X. 
23 Id., Part 2, c. I, §l, Art. IV. 
24 U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. 
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